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TAX COMMENT
Editor-THEODORE S. WECKER
A STUDY IN CHAINING THE CHAIN STOREs.-Fraught with
the danger of ignominious economic extinction, individual entre-
preneurs assisted by small jobbers and wholesalers are now fighting
for their very existence against powerful chain store organizations.
So acute has the problem struck in the various states, that over
123 anti-chain bills were introduced in divers legislative halls during
1931.1
The chain store has been considered as a throwback, or, a con-
tinuation of a monopolistic society. Starting in 1880 and continu-
ing until after the World War, our credit and banking structure
was subject to a mushroom growth and attained gigantic proportions.
There was a rapid concentration of economic wealth 2 and as a re-
sult the independent entrepreneur was confronted by a practically
invincible aggregation of chain stores 3 seeking his expropriation. 4
It is not the purpose of the writer to trace the growth of chain stores
nor to comment on the causes thereof. This has already been ably
accomplished. 5 To examine the course of the judicial history of
the various legislative attempts to bridle this growing Frankenstein
is deemed more teleological.
State legislative regulation of the chain stores has generally
taken the form of an occupation tax on retail selling, measured by
gross volume of sales of all stores, and may limit the number of
store units operated under unified control in a named territory.6
Another form is a license tax on the basis of the number of stores
'In 1930, bills containing a tax on chain stores were presented in 29 states.
ANNUAL REPORT OF NATIONAL CHAIN STORE ASSOCIATION (1930) 16. The
character and nature of the 1931 bills are presented in an issue of BARRON'S Of
August 3, 1931, in an article by William Nichols, Chain Stores Fighting Unfair
Taxes.2 BERLE AND MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932); 2 HAYES, OUR ECONOMIC SYSTEM (1929) c. 56; PATTERSON AND
SCHOLTZ, ECONOMIC PROBLEMS OF MODERN LIFE (1927) c. 22; Cf. KING, THE
NATIONAL INCOME AND ITS PURCHASING POWER (1930).
'ZIMMERMAN, THE CHALLENGE OF CHAIN STORE DISTRIBUTION (1931)
reports an 800% increase in store units during the last 15 years doing
$15,000,000,000 worth of business annually.
4 VEBLEN, ABSENTEE OWNERSHIP AND BUSINESS ENTERPRISE: CASE OF
AMERICA (1923).
'FLOWERS, AMERICA CHAINED (1931); FRYBERGER, THE ABOLiTION OF
POVERTY (1931) ; CAMERON, OUR JUGGERNAUT- (1932) ; Becker and Hess, The
Chain Store License Tax (1930) 7 N. C. L. REv. 115; Notes (1930) 44 HARP.
L. REv. 1295; (1932) 80 U. OF PA. L. REv. 289; (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 431;
(1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 145; (1930) 15 MINN. L. REv. 341; (1931) 17 IOWA
L. REv. 72; (1932) 18 VA. L. REv. 72, 769.
Kansas and Maryland have such statutes.
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over a given number operated by a single owner. 7  Some states
contain hybrid statutes combining both forms.
The first litigation on chain stores concerned a tax on groceries
utilizing the services of delivery wagons. With the latter as a basis
for classification, a Kentucky court in 1926 held the tax invalid.8
A distinction was attempted in that case between cash and carry
stores and credit grocery stores but to no avail. In 1927 a license
tax on a chain store was held invalid where the grounds for the
discrimination was the prevention of monopolies and competition. 9
In the following year close attention was riveted on the decision
of the North Carolina Supreme Court, holding an anti-chain store
tax unconstitutional in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v.
Doughton.'0 A difference only in respect to ownership and method
of operation was there said to be insufficient as a basis for classifica-
tion. A federal district court subsequently reiterated this position
in a case later to become noteworthy.'1 It is therefore apparent
that at the outset the first round of legal battles favored the chain
stores. This was rather surprising in view of previous decisions
bearing on matters of a similar pattern.12 To further blast the
hopes of the private owners, the Supreme Court held unconstitu-
tional a Pennsylvania tax on the gross receipts of corporations en-
gaged in a general taxicab business but not upon the receipts of
individuals or partnerships also in the taxicab business. 13
The situation took on a more hopeful complexion for the in-
dividual entrepreneur when North Carolina practically reversed its
'Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Iowa, Michigan, Mississippi, North
Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island and Kentucky are some of the states
representing the latter form.
'City of Danville v. Quaker Maid Co., 211 Ky. 677, 278 S. W. 98 (1926).
"Keystone Grocery and Tea Co. v. Huster (Md. Equity 1927) (unre-
ported). Compare the present mind of the U. S. Supreme Court on this point
now, infra note 25.
196 N. C. 145, 144 S. E. 701 (1928). See extended discussion of the legal
and economic implications in Becker and Hess, Chain Store License Tax (1930)
7 N. C. L. REv. 115; see also STRAUN, BAITING THE CHAIN STORE (1930) 27;
Note (1930) 40 YALE L. J. 431, 433.
'Jackson v. State Board of Tax Commissioners, 38 F. (2d) 652 (Ind.
1930), overruled in Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, infra note 16.
' The basis of the amount of business transacted is a reasonable or funda-
mental difference in the character of a business as wholesaler and retailer.
Southwestern Oil Co. v. Texas, 217 U. S. 114, 30 Sup. Ct. 496 (1910). Co-
operative markets are considered of a separate class. Liberty Warehouse Co.
v. Burley Tobacco Growers Co-op., 276 U. S. 71, 48 Sup. Ct. 291 (1928).Judicial pronouncements are numerous, allowing the legislatures to classify
objects of legislation in different categories regarding taxation, as long as the
tax bears equally and rests on a substantial basis. Heisler v. Thomas Colliery
Co., 260 U. S. 245, 43 Sup. Ct. 83 (1922) ; Radice v. New York, 264 U. S. 292,
44 Sup. Ct. 325 (1914) ; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U. S. 32,
48 Sup. Ct. 423 (1928). A more complete list can be found in Note (1931) 31
COL. L. Rxv. 145 and (1930) 15 MiNN. L. Rzv: 341.
"Quaker City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, 277 U. S. 389, 48 Sup. Ct. 533(1928). It is interesting to note that the present Mr. Justice Roberts of the
Supreme Court argued the appeal for the taxicab corporations.
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former ruling' 4 and upheld a tax against chain stores in Great
Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Maxwell.15 A substantial difference
between a business of one store and the operation of a business of
many stores was suddenly discerned. In 1931, the Supreme Court
dispelled all doubts as to the constitutionality of a license tax on
chain stores. The Court emphasized in Tax Commissioners of
Indiam v. Jackson'0 that it was not its function to consider the
propriety or unjustness of a tax, or to seek for the motives, or to
criticize the public policy that prompted its enactment. It was rather
to sustain the classification adopted if there were substantial differ-
ences between the occupations separately classified. 17
Here, the tax was graduated or based on the number of stores
operated by a single owner. The dissenting judges based their argu-
ment on the Quaker City Cab Co.'8 case, Mr. Justice Sutherland
saying that classification cannot be based on the number of roofs
under which a business is carried on. Nor can it be based on the
amount of income or the character of the sources but rather it must
be determined on the number of sources from which the income is
obtained.
The more liberal attitude of the Jackson case was not unex-
pected. With O'Gornan & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.19
in mind, a tolerant attitude toward state legislative action was ex-
pected.20 Although the case involved an exercise of police power
there is sufficient similarity between both to indiscriminately use
decisions of one as indicia for the other.2 ' That a state could in-
fringe on the equal protection clause of the Constitution by its
revenue laws encouraging one industry at the expense of another
is clear. It seems by a great weight of authority that the wisdom
of the legislature is beyond the power of the courts.22 The 1932
14 Supra note 10.
15 199 N. C. 433, 154 S. E. 838 (1930), aff'd in 284 U. S. 575, 52 Sup. Ct.
26 (1931) decided solely on the basis of the Jackson case, although the dissen-
ters in that case still announce their divergent opinions.
"283 U. S. 527, 51 Sup. Ct. 540 (1931); Note (1932) 6 ST. JoHN's L.
REV. 163. This case was followed in all fours in Mitchel v. Penny Stores, 284
U. S. 576, 52 Sup. Ct. 27 (1931).
17 Opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts, who was elevated by this time to the
Supreme Court Bench. His position is contra to his part played in Quaker
City Cab Co. v. Pennsylvania, supra note 13.
"' Supra note 13.
19282 U. S. 251, 51 Sup. Ct. 130 (1931), a restriction on fire insurance
companies was upheld. The conservatives here used the subterfuge of liberty
of contract but Mr. Justice Brandeis saw enough public interest involved to
invoke police powers.
Hamilton, The Jurists Art (1931) 31 COL. L. REv. 1073.
Pendleton Howard, The Supreme Court and State Action Under the 14th
Amendment (1933) 81 U. OF PA. L. Rxv. 505.
'Tyson v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 47 Sup. Ct. 426 (1927); Finkelstein,
From Munn v. Ill. to Tyson v. Banton (1927) 27 CoL L. REv. 769. In that
decision Mr. Justice Stone says at p. 446, 47 Sup. Ct. 433, "It would be better
to recognize that the legislature can do whatever it sees fit to do unless it is
restrained by some express prohibition of Court of the U. S. or of the State
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term of the Supreme Court carried on in this vein in Lawrence v.
Tax Commissioners of Mississippi,23 but weakened in the Liebman
case.24 State taxation of chain stores as an exercise of police powers
might be upheld on the basis of these decisions.
Recently, however, the security of the states maintaining the
right to discriminate against chain stores was rudely shaken by
Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee.25 Nevertheless, a close examination
of the majority opinion should dispel any fears as to a reversal of
the principles of the Jackson case for, in reality, the principles of
the latter are given added strength. Doubtless this case is a land-
mark in sociological jurisprudence as is evidenced by the exhaustive
and scholarly dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis.
In the main case, Florida imposed a license tax, for operating
stores, on any person, firm, corporation, association or co-partnership
under the same general management or ownership, graduated ac-
cording to the number of stores and increased if the stores are lo-
cated in different counties. 26  Mr. Justice Roberts, writing for the
majority, held the tax invalid, stating:
1. The state legislature may utilize the distinction between a
chain store merchandising method and that adopted by a department
store or one individually operated, as well as the difference between
the integrated and voluntary chain as a basis for classification. The
differences need not be great to uphold the legislative classifica-
Courts, and that the courts should be careful not to extend such prohibition
beyond their obvious meaning by reading into them conceptions of public policy
that the particular court may happen to entertain."
' 286 U. S. 276, 52 Sup. Ct. 556 (1932). A state law exempting domestic
corporations from a tax on activities outside the state was held constitutional,
since the protection furnished by state laws merited a tax on foreign cor-
porations.
285 U. S. 262, 52 Sup. Ct. 371 (1932).
52 Sup. Ct. 481 (U. S. 1933).
LAws FLA. 1931 (Ex. SESS.) cc. 156, 24, §§5, 11. The relevant sections
read as follows: "The license fees herein prescribed shall be
"'(1) Upon one store, the annual license fee shall be Five Dollars
for each such store.
"'(2) Upon two stores or more, but not exceeding fifteen stores,
where the same are located in any one county, the annual license fee shall
be Ten Dollars for each such additional store.
"'(3) Upon two stores or more, but not to exceed fifteen stores,
where the same are located in different counties, the annual license fee
shall be Fifteen Dollars for each such additional store.
"'(4) Upon each store in excess of fifteen, but not to exceed thirty,
when all are located in any one county, the annual license fee shall be
Fifteen Dollars for each such additional store. * * *
"'(5) Upon each store in excess of fifteen, but not to exceed thirty,
where the same are located in different counties, the annual license fee
shall be Twenty Dollars for each such additional store. * * *
"'In addition to the above amounts, Three Dollars for each and
every One Thousand Dollars of value of stock carried in each store or
for sale in such store.'"
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tion as long as it is reasonable between the subjects taxed. The
position of the Court in the Jackson case was completely reiterated.
2. Both a graduated county license tax and a municipal li-
cense tax, each consisting of 25% of the state tax imposed on store
owners based on the number of licensee's stores within the county
or municipality, respectively, without regard to other stores beyond
the county limit, is constitutional.
3. A chain store license tax of $3 on each $1,000 value of
stock carried in each store does not deprive chain store operators
of equal protection even though wholesalers are subject to but half
the same tax. In the absence of record proof or legislative declara-
tion, the court will not construe the statute as antagonizing large
corporate chains.
4. Mere gradation of a tax according to the number of stores
operated is constitutional. However, where the tax is increased
solely because they are operated in different counties, the Four-
teenth Amendment is violated, and that part of the statute is
unconstitutional.
Mr. Justice Cardozo, dissenting in part, insists that the test
of territorial expansion is valid in this case since movement from
one field of activity to another implies inner changes and a desire
to play for larger stakes. He stresses the importance of knowing
why a discrimination is desired, to what end directed, and the re-
lation between the end and means.2 7 Mr. Justice Cardozo is con-
tent merely to show the majority the deficiency of the ground of
their decision points to the brilliant opinion of his colleague for
further elucidation.
Mr. Justice Brandeis, in what no doubt shall be considered as
one of his outstanding declarations of social and economic policy,
submits several grounds for upholding the Florida anti-chain tax
overlooked by the majority decision and counsel alike. First, since
all the appellants are corporations, the state may discriminate against
them as a price for the privilege of carrying on intrastate business
in any way it sees fit. This is a continuance of the limitations al-
ways placed on corporate bodies.28  The necessity for a prolonged
'? Mr. Justice Cardozo, supra note 25, at 504, "If the motive is vindictive-
ness, ensuing in mere oppression, the result may be one thing. If the motive
and the end attained are the advancement of the public good, the result may be
quite another. * * * The legislature lias found them in those variations of degree
that separate a chain within the territorial unit of the locality from chains that
are reaching out for wider fields of power. There is no need to approve or
disapprove the concept of utility or inutility reflected in such laws."
Mr. Justice Brandeis, at p. 500, "Whenever the discrimination is for
a permitted purpose-as when a state, having concluded that activity by
corporations should be curbed, seeks to favor businesses conducted by indi-
viduals-the corporate character of the owner presents a difference in ownership
which may be made the sole basis of classification in taxation, as in regulation.
The discrimination cannot, in such a case, be held arbitrary, since it is made in
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and constant control is the basis of a brilliant sociological, political
and economic study. Second, the plaintiffs being among the giant
corporations which have too closely concentrated economic power
merits chastisement lest they dominate the state and thwart American
ideals. 29
Briefly then, the Ligget v. Lee decision illustrates the utility
of the Fourteenth Amendment as a control not on the legislative
privilege of impolicy but rather on the legislative right to be ra-
tional according to the thought of five men on the Supreme Court.
The majority reiterates the legislative right to serve a public service
in checking chain stores but becomes picayune in its strict construc-
tion of "reasonable classification." As long as the Indiana type of
statute is employed (passed on in the Jackson case), where the
basis of taxation is the number of units operated by a single owner,
the chains are subjected to the tender mercies of the legislature.
Evidently, the majority of the Supreme Court insists upon a rigid
adherence and a strict construction. They refuse to follow Mr.
Justice Holmes' theories of constitutional presumptions as to penum-
bras of permitted legislative unreasonableness, or to consider the
propriety, the necessity for factual foundations, or the public policy
motivating the legislative enactment.
3 0
Of greater significance is the exalted position of the Supreme
Court in the determination of social control. However serene it
may pretend to be in itself, the Court is a focal point of a set of
dynamic forces which plays havoc with the landmarks of the Ameri-
can state. Its decisions operate to shift or stabilize the balance of
social control and in a statesmanlike fashion controls the modes
of developing capitalism.31  The power to deal with fundamental
economic and social questions arising in the states are wholly de-
rived from its interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The
esoteric functions of applying these constitutional guarantees to taxa-
tion has enormously increased the prestige and authority of the Su-
order to effect the permitted hostile purpose and is appropriate to that end.
Compare Lawrence v. State Tax Commission, 286 U. S. 276, 283-285, 52 Sup.
Ct. 556; People of State of New York ex rel. New York & Albany Lighterage
Co. v. Lynch, 288 U. S. -, 53 Sup. Ct. 400."And at p. 497, "The citizens of the state, considering themselves vitally
interested in this seemingly unequal struggle, have undertaken to aid the indi-
vidual retailers by subjecting the owners of multiple stores to the handicap of
higher license fees. They may have done so merely in order to preserve com-
petition. But their purpose may have been a broader and deeper one. They
may have believed that the chain store, by furthering the concentration of
wealth and of power and by promoting absentee ownership, is thwarting Ameri-
can ideals; that it is making impossible equality of opportunity; that it is con-
verting independent tradesmen into clerks; and that it is sapping the resources,
the vigor and the hope of the smaller cities and towns."
' Dissenting opinions of Mr. Justice Holmes (1930); FRANK, LAW AND
THE MODERN MIND (1930) 253 et seq.; Frankfurter, Mr. Jutice Holmes and
the Constitution (1927) 41 HARv. L. REv. 121.
' Max Lerner, The Supreme Court and American Capitalism (1933) 42
YALE L. J. 668.
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preme Court and has thrown into striking relief the American doc-
trine of judicial review of legislation. 2
Early in the present century the small man found himself crowd-
ed out by Big Business. Consequently, State Granger legislation,
the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, and the Interstate Commerce Act
were effectuated. Trust-busting became a rampant activity. But
the Supreme Court soon crippled these activities by emasculating
the effects of the statutes.83 Big Business saw to it that the court
remain impervious and lassitudinous toward economic reality.34 The
majority of the Court working within technical and legal barricades
could easily utilize such subterfuges as stare decisis, police power,
due process, liberty of contract, and doctrine of consistency.
In direct contrast, Mr. Justice Brandeis has stood firmly for
holding business enterprise rigorously to its social responsibilities.
He has kept himself sensitive to current trends in economic organi-
zation. Believing in competition and in the present economic set-up,
he has sought to socialize and ethicize business. He believes the
state should control by judicious intervention, wherever necessary,
our economic and social organization.3 5 Although the present set-up
of the Court is nominally liberal, it seems that their liberality ap-
plies only to personal liberty. It shall continue to be conservative
in the protection of property rights. This is paradoxical in this
period of weakening individualism and it seems that there should
have been more toleration in departing from an absolute concept
of property and liberty.3 6
In its final analysis, it seems unfortunate that the interpreta-
tion of what is reasonable and arbitrary is made so flexible that it
bends as the will of only five Supreme Court judges. The mental
background of these judges, their sense of ethical and social values
seem too intangible to determine vital problems. The immediate
will of the people is left outside the scope of their consideration.
Judicial fiat should not solve the issues of economics, business and
sociology. The state should be given freedom of experimentation,
especially in the field of chain store taxation, and, if it finds its
I 'BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1932). His thesis points out the
super-legislative powers of the Supreme Court being particularly dangerous,
since outside the scope of popular control. FRANKFURTER AND LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1927) make manifest that under the guise
of legal form the court exercises far-reaching economic and social control.
' Vide FEDERAL ANTI-TRUST LAWS, A SYmPOSiUm (1932); Watkins, The
Federal Trade Commission (1932) 32 COL. L. REV. 272.
" BEARD, ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE SUPREME COURT (1913). The
author indicates that the Supreme Court might effectively control capitalistic
growth if only it remained static, but the former is too dignified and formalistic.
'Lerner, Social Thought of Mr. Justice Brandeis (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 1.
In American Column and Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U. S. 377, 42 Sup.
Ct. 114 (1921), Mr. Justice Brandeis presents his clear-cut analysis with a
passionate and engaging persuasiveness.
' Shulman, The Supreme Court's Attitude Toward Liberty of Contract and
Freedom of Speech (1931) 41 YALE L. J. 262.
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remedial tax measures unwise, the state legislature itself should
undo the harm without the assumed paternalistic intervention of the
Supreme Court.
WILLIAM H. SHAPIRO.*
THE GIFT TAX AS APPLIED TO REVOCABLE TRusTs.-Congress,
in 1924, included among the provisions of the revenue act of that
year, a tax upon gifts.I "For the calendar year 1924 and each
calendar year thereafter * * * a tax * * * is hereby imposed upon
the transfer by a resident by gift during such calendar year of
any property wherever situated, whether made directly or indi-
rectly * * *." 2 This levy was included to supplement the estate
and income taxes, which had been frequently avoided by the making
of large gifts.3 The gift tax being a new venture in the field of
taxation, Congress did not expressly state its intention in- regard
to all the situations that might arise. It was not known until the
case of Burnet v. Guggenheim,4 whether Congress intended to in-
clude as a gift inter vivos the delivery of the revocable deed of trust
or whether the intent was to tax such gift upon the extinguishment
of the power of revocation.
In the Guggenheim case 5 it appeared that in June, 1917, the
defendant executed two. deeds of trust for the benefit of each of
his two children. The trusts were to continue for ten years. At
the end of the ten-year period, the principal and accumulated in-
come were to go to the beneficiaries if living. In the event of their
death, other dispositions were made. The settlor also reserved to
himself powers of control in respect to the trust property and its
investment and administration. In particular, there was an unre-
stricted power to modify, alter or revoke the trusts except as to
* B.S.S., LL.B., J.S.D. (St. John's Law School, 1932), Tax Editor ST.
JOHN'S LAW REvmw, 1931-1932, Member of the New York Bar.
REv. AcT OF 1924, 43 Stat. 253, 313, c. 234, §§319, 320, 26 U. S. C.,
§§1131, 1132; see (1930) 28 MIcH. L. Rtv. 778. This section was repealed by
the Revenue Act of 1926 and later incorporated into the Revenue Act of 1932.
GLEASON AND OTIS, INHERITANCE TAXATION (4th ed.) 182, "The federal gift
tax is a new departure in taxation-never before in the history of English-
speaking people has such a tax been levied, and yet it is a natural outgrowth of
the effort of Congress and the state legislatures to reach the corpus of all
estates undiminished by any act of the decedent during his lifetime." Bromley
v. McCaughn, 280 U. S. 124, 50 Sup. Ct. 46 (1929); (1930) 4 ST. JOHN'S L.
Rv. 314.
2 Ibid.
'Hunter, Gifts in Contemplation of Death, 7 NAT.- TAX Ass' BULLETIN
146; Note (1930) 5 ST. JOHN's L. Rav. 147.
'287 U. S. -, 53 Sup. Ct. 369 (1933).
G Ibid.
